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The Impact of the American Doctrine of Discovery on 
Native Land Rights in Australia, Canada, 
and New Zealand 
Blake A. Watson† 
The landmark decision in the United States regarding Indian land 
rights is Johnson v. McIntosh, an 1823 decision authored by Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall.  The Supreme Court in Johnson unequivocally re-
jected the most favorable view of indigenous land rights—that the native 
inhabitants own the land they occupy and are free to retain or sell their 
property.1  Yet the Court did not adopt the least favorable view of Indian 
land rights either—that the tribes of America are trespassers without 
ownership or possessory rights.  Instead, Marshall endorsed an interme-
diate position.  On one hand, he declared the Indian nations “to be the 
rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim to retain 
possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion . . . .”2  
On the other hand, Marshall proclaimed that European discovery of 
America “gave exclusive title to those who made it,” and that such dis-
covery “necessarily diminished” the power of Indian nations “to dispose 
of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased.”3 
Johnson v. McIntosh sets forth a “limited possessor” conception of 
indigenous land rights.  Eleven years after Johnson, the United States 
Supreme Court appeared to adopt a “limited owner” theory of native land 
rights in Worcester v. Georgia.  In Worcester, Marshall wrote that In-
dians do in fact own the lands they occupy but are not free to sell their 
lands to whomsoever they please because the discoverer holds a preemp-
tive right to acquire their property rights.4  Michael Blumm describes the 
native right as a “fee simple [that is] subject to the government’s right of 
preemption” or, alternatively, as a “fee simple with a partial restraint on 
                                                 
† Professor of Law, University of Dayton School of Law.  J.D., Duke University School of Law, 
1981; B.A., Vanderbilt University, 1978. 
 1. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823). 
 2. Id. (emphasis added). 
 3. Id. (emphasis added). 
 4. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 544 (1832). 
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alienation.”5  Either description is consistent with the limited owner con-
ception of indigenous land rights. 
Most commentators consider the limited owner theory presented in 
Worcester to be “the best presentation of Marshall’s matured views on 
property foundations and Indian title.”6  Yet Johnson remains the leading 
decision on native property rights in the United States.  In 1955, Justice 
Stanley Reed relied on the “great case of Johnson v. McIntosh” to hold 
that Indian title may be terminated by the United States “without any 
legally enforceable obligation to compensate the Indians.”7  More recent-
ly, in City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, the Supreme Court reaf-
firmed the limited possessor conception of indigenous land rights by stat-
ing that under the doctrine of discovery, “fee title to the lands occupied 
by Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign—
first the discovering European nation and later the original States and the 
United States.”8 
The Johnson discovery rule has not only diminished native rights in 
the United States, but has also influenced the definition of indigenous 
land rights in Australia, Canada, and New Zealand.  In 1836, British 
lawyer William Burge cited Johnson v. McIntosh in support of his con-
clusion that a private purchase of some 600,000 acres from the Australi-
                                                 
 5. Michael C. Blumm, Retracing the Discovery Doctrine: Aboriginal Title, Tribal Sovereignty, 
and Their Significance to Treaty-Making and Modern Natural Resources Policy in Indian Country, 
28 VT. L. REV. 713, 741 & n.183 (2004). 
 6. Joshua L. Seifert, Comment, The Myth of Johnson v. M’Intosh, 52 UCLA L. REV. 289, 330 
(2004).  See also John Hurley, Aboriginal Rights, the Constitution and the Marshall Court, 17 
REVUE JURIDIQUE THÉMIS 403, 430 (1982–83) (Worcester marked “the culmination of [Chief Jus-
tice Marshall’s] thinking on the rights and status of indigenous peoples within the United States.”).  
The historical and legal treatment of Indian land rights in the United States has been the subject of 
numerous books and articles.  See, e.g., STUART BANNER, HOW THE INDIANS LOST THEIR LAND: 
LAW AND POWER ON THE FRONTIER (2005); ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE AMERICA, DISCOVERED 
AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY (2006); STEVEN 
T. NEWCOMB, PAGANS IN THE PROMISED LAND: DECODING THE DOCTRINE OF CHRISTIAN 
DISCOVERY (2008); LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE DISCOVERY OF 
AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS (2005); DAVID E. WILKINS, 
AMERICAN INDIAN SOVEREIGNTY AND THE U.S. SUPREME COURT: THE MASKING OF JUSTICE 
(1997); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL THOUGHT: THE 
DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST (1990); Milner S. Ball, Constitution, Court, Indian Tribes, 1987 AM. B. 
FOUND. RES. J. 1; Howard R. Berman, The Concept of Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History 
of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REV. 637 (1978); Blumm, supra note 5; J. Youngblood Henderson, 
Unraveling the Riddle of Aboriginal Title, 5 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 75 (1977); Eric Kades, The Dark 
Side of Efficiency: Johnson v. M’Intosh and the Expropriation of American Indian Lands, 148 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1065 (2000); Blake A. Watson, John Marshall and Indian Land Rights: A Historical 
Rejoinder to the Claim of ‘Universal Recognition’ of the Doctrine of Discovery, 36 SETON HALL L. 
REV. 481 (2006). 
 7. Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 279 (1955). 
 8. City of Sherrill, N.Y. v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197, 203 n.1 (2005) (quoting Onei-
da Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, N.Y., 414 U.S. 661, 667 (1974)). 
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an Aborigines was invalid as against the Crown.9  British land specula-
tors, settlers, and government officials quoted American jurists in dis-
putes concerning the annexation of New Zealand in the 1840s, and John-
son figured prominently in the colony’s first judicial decision regarding 
Mâori property rights.10  Likewise, when the existence and scope of ab-
original title was finally litigated in Canada in the 1880s, the Johnson 
decision played a major role.11 
This Article describes the impact of the American doctrine of dis-
covery on native land rights in the former British colonies of Australia, 
New Zealand, and Canada.  Part I briefly describes Johnson v. McIntosh 
and Worcester v. Georgia.  Parts II, III, and IV describe the influence of 
Johnson on initial formulations of indigenous land rights by British au-
thorities in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.  Parts V, VI, and VII 
examine the current status of native land rights in the aforementioned 
countries.  Part VIII concludes with a brief discussion of the U.N. Decla-
ration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples—a movement away from the 
doctrine of discovery and towards a reconceptualization of indigenous 
rights. 
Johnson v. McIntosh influenced the lawyers and jurists who first 
addressed the issue of indigenous rights in Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada.  On one hand, foreign courts used Johnson to limit the land 
rights of the original occupants.  On the other hand, Johnson has been 
cited to acknowledge that the Australian Aborigines, the Mâori of New 
Zealand, and the First Nations of Canada possess certain property rights 
entitled to judicial protection.  Although Johnson did not adopt the least 
favorable view of native land rights, the American doctrine of discovery 
nonetheless remains a justification for the diminishment of indigenous 
rights.  As the world moves towards re-conceptualizing the rights of in-
digenous peoples, it is time to reject the American doctrine of discovery, 
wherever it is applied.  By endorsing the U.N. Declaration on the Rights 
of Indigenous Peoples, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, and 
Canada would take a significant step in the right direction. 
I.  THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF DISCOVERY 
Although American jurisprudence has influenced the definition of 
native land rights in Australia, New Zealand, and Canada, it would be a 
mistake to assume that the indigenous inhabitants of those countries hold 
the same legal rights—and status—as Indians in the United States.  The 
                                                 
 9. JAMES BONWICK, PORT PHILLIP SETTLEMENT 378 (1883). 
 10. See discussion infra Parts II, III. 
 11. See infra Part IV. 
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“original Indian title” of American Indians is unique insofar as it is held 
by tribal groups that have been accorded the status of “domestic depen-
dent nations.”12  As Kent McNeil has pointed out, 
[O]nly the United States acknowledged the internal sovereignty of 
the Indigenous peoples—the Indian tribes or nations—living within 
its borders.  Canada, Australia and New Zealand all relied on the 
British constitutional doctrines of unity of the Crown and parlia-
mentary sovereignty to deny official acknowledgement of even the 
internal sovereignty of their Indigenous peoples.13 
While the United States may have acknowledged the internal sovereignty 
of the American Indians, the Supreme Court, in Johnson, created a strict 
limitation on this sovereignty as it applied to native land rights. 
Johnson v. McIntosh was “an action of ejectment for lands in the 
State and District of Illinois, claimed by the plaintiffs under a purchase 
and conveyance from the Piankeshaw Indians and by the defendant under 
a grant from the United States.”14  The plaintiffs relied on a 1775 deed, 
pursuant to which eleven Piankeshaw tribal chiefs deeded two large 
tracts of land along the Wabash River to twenty men from Virginia, 
Maryland, Pennsylvania, Great Britain, and the Illinois Country.15   In 
1805, the Piankeshaw Tribe ceded the same land to the United States.16  
William McIntosh subsequently purchased several tracts from the federal 
government, thus setting up a conflict in title.17 
The defendant McIntosh argued that the 1775 purchase was invalid 
because Indian tribes lack the legal capacity to sell land to private indi-
viduals.18  As restated by Chief Justice Marshall, the dispute in Johnson 
v. McIntosh concerned “the power of Indians to give, and of private indi-
viduals to receive, a title, which can be sustained in the courts of this 
                                                 
 12. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 14 (1831). 
 13. Kent McNeil, Judicial Treatment of Indigenous Land Rights in the Common Law World, in 
INDIGENOUS PEOPLES AND THE LAW: COMPARATIVE AND CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES 257, 258 (Ben-
jamin J. Richardson et al. eds., 2009) (footnote omitted). 
 14. Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 543 (1823). 
 15. Id. at 555–56.  In similar fashion, seven chiefs of the Illinois confederacy conveyed two 
large tracts of land in 1773 to twenty-two individuals from Great Britain, Pennsylvania, and the 
Illinois Country.  Id. at 550–51.  Five of the grantees in the Piankeshaw (or Wabash) purchase were 
also subscribers to the Illinois purchase.  The two groups subsequently formed the United Illinois 
and Wabash Land Company.  See, e.g., LINDSAY G. ROBERTSON, CONQUEST BY LAW: HOW THE 
DISCOVERY OF AMERICA DISPOSSESSED INDIGENOUS PEOPLES OF THEIR LANDS 10–14 (2005).  The 
plaintiffs in Johnson were heirs of Thomas Johnson, the first governor of Maryland and one of the 
original grantees in the Wabash purchase.  Id. at 47. 
 16. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 560. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. at 567. 
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country.”19  To resolve this dispute, Marshall set forth the American ver-
sion of the doctrine of discovery and denied the right of Indians to con-
vey legal title to the lands they occupy: 
They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a 
legal as well as just claim to retain possession of it, . . . but their 
rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, were neces-
sarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own 
will, to whomsoever they pleased, was denied by the original fun-
damental principle, that discovery gave exclusive title to those who 
made it.20 
Under the Johnson discovery rule, Indians possess a right of occu-
pancy but are “deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to oth-
ers.”21  The discovering nation gained ownership to all native lands and 
acquired the “exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title of occupan-
cy.”22  The indigenous inhabitants thus held limited possessor rights: 
their right of occupancy was subject to the discoverer’s dual rights of 
ownership and preemption. 
John Marshall and the Supreme Court reexamined the discovery 
doctrine in Worcester v. Georgia.23  In the 1832 decision, Marshall an-
nounced that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community occupying 
its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the laws 
of Georgia can have no force . . . .”24  In dicta, the Chief Justice also of-
fered a divergent view of the doctrine of discovery.  In Johnson, Mar-
shall noted that the “absolute ultimate title has been considered as ac-
quired by discovery, subject only to the Indian title of occupancy.”25  In 
Worcester, the Chief Justice dropped the limited possessor view of In-
dian title in favor of a limited owner conception: 
This principle . . . gave to the nation making the discov-
ery . . . the sole right of acquiring the soil and of making settlements 
on it. . . .  It regulated the right given by discovery among the Euro-
pean discoverers; but could not affect the rights of those already in 
possession . . . .  It gave the exclusive right to purchase, but did not 
found that right on a denial of the right of the possessor to sell.26 
                                                 
 19. Id. at 572. 
 20. Id. at 574 (emphasis added). 
 21. Id. at 591. 
 22. Id. at 587. 
 23. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). 
 24. Id. at 561. 
 25. Johnson, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) at 592. 
 26. Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 544 (emphasis added). 
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In other words, Indians continue to “own” their lands but are no longer 
free to sell to whomsoever they please because discovery created an ex-
clusive right to acquire the property rights of the Indians.  This concept 
marks a shift away from the limited possessor view of Indian title, whe-
reby the Indians do not own the lands they occupy.  Under the limited 
possessor view, the United States (or one of the original colonies) owns 
the land and can either extinguish the Indian possessory rights or transfer 
ownership subject to the native right of possession.  In Worcester, the 
Chief Justice sought to return the ownership of native lands to the In-
dians, subject to the government’s exclusive right of preemption. 
Although Worcester seemingly rejected the Johnson discovery rule, 
the Supreme Court ultimately endorsed the doctrine of discovery as arti-
culated in Johnson v. McIntosh.27  It is the “celebrated case of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh” that is featured by Justice Joseph Story in his Commentaries 
on the Constitution of the United States28 and by New York Chancellor 
James Kent in his Commentaries on American Law.29  Likewise, when 
the issue of indigenous land rights surfaced in Australia, New Zealand, 
and Canada, it was Johnson’s formulation of the American doctrine of 
discovery that had the greatest impact. 
II.  BATMAN AND AUSTRALIA 
Just thirteen years after Marshall and the Supreme Court decided 
Johnson v. McIntosh, British lawyers relied upon Marshall’s opinion to 
conclude that a private purchase of land from the Australian Aborigines 
was unauthorized and void.  In Johnson, the putative purchasers formed 
the United Illinois and Wabash Land Company and argued that an Indian 
tribe could transfer a valid, lawful title to a private grantee.  In similar 
fashion, a group of land speculators, led by John Batman, decided in 
1835 to acquire land in Australia directly from the local inhabitants.  
British officials, however, refused to sanction the purchase.  Over time, 
Australia adopted the legal fiction of terra nullius—the most extreme 
form of the discovery doctrine, which maintains that indigenous occu-
pants of a “discovered” country have no enforceable property rights. 
                                                 
 27. See, e.g., United States v. Cook, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 591, 593 (1873) (the authority of John-
son “has never been doubted”); ROBERTSON, supra note 15, at 138–44 (describing the Supreme 
Court’s restoration of the Johnson discovery rule following the Worcester decision).  The chief 
reason that the Johnson rule prevailed is that the composition of the Supreme Court underwent sig-
nificant change after the death of John Marshall in 1835.  By 1838, seven of the nine justices had 
been nominated by either Andrew Jackson or Martin Van Buren.  The reconfigured Court proceeded 
to ignore Marshall’s statements in Worcester regarding Indian land rights. 
 28. JOSEPH STORY, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 8, at 8 
(1st ed. 1833). 
 29. JAMES KENT, 3 COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 379 (2d ed. 1832). 
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John Batman was born in New South Wales in 1801, the son of a 
cutler who had been sent to Australia for receiving stolen goods.30  After 
relocating to Van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania), he married a former con-
vict, with whom he had seven daughters and a son.  In 1833, Batman was 
afflicted with syphilis, a malady that, along with the prescribed cure of 
mercury, eventually disfigured and killed him.31  As the leading member 
of the Port Phillip Association, Batman negotiated the largest private 
purchase of aboriginal land in the history of Australia.  The Port Phillip 
Association thus followed in the footsteps of the United Illinois and Wa-
bash Land Company, and its attempt to acquire a “good” title from the 
indigenous inhabitants met a similar fate. 
In the early 1830s, John Batman and other inhabitants of Van Di-
emen’s Land became interested in acquiring large tracts of land in Port 
Phillip Bay, a large, shallow body of water next to present-day Mel-
bourne.32  When efforts to obtain a government land grant were unsuc-
cessful, Batman and fourteen other men formed a syndicate and resolved 
to purchase land directly from the Aborigines.33  On the tenth of May, 
1835, Batman led a small party across the Bass Strait and, according to 
his diary, completed the transaction with the Dutigalla-Aborigines on the 
sixth of June: “I purchased two large tracts of land from them—about 
600,000 acres, more or less—and delivered over to them blankets, 
knives, looking-glasses, tomahawks, beads, scissors, flour, etc., as pay-
ment for the land, and also agreed to give them a tribute, or rent, year-
ly.”34 
The Aborigines most likely did not understand the “treaty,” and 
some scholars suspect that their marks on the deeds were forged.35  In 
any event, Batman was heralded as the “Tasmanian Penn”36—a compari-
son that failed to appreciate that the Crown had authorized William Penn 
to purchase land in Pennsylvania.37  The Dutigalla purchase, in contrast, 
                                                 
 30. RONALD T. RIDLEY, MELBOURNE’S MONUMENTS 29 (1996). 
 31. See, e.g., ALASTAIR H. CAMPBELL, JOHN BATMAN AND THE ABORIGINES 16, 114–15, 222 
(1987); RIDLEY, supra note 30, at 29–31; PERCIVAL SERLE, 1 DICTIONARY OF AUSTRALIAN 
BIOGRAPHY 59 (1949). 
 32. JOHN C. WEAVER, THE GREAT LAND RUSH AND THE MAKING OF THE MODERN WORLD, 
1650–1900, at 138 (2003). 
 33. SERLE, supra note 31, at 59–60. 
 34. C. P. BILLOT, JOHN BATMAN: THE STORY OF JOHN BATMAN AND THE FOUNDING OF 
MELBOURNE 97 (1979). 
 35. BAIN ATTWOOD & HELEN DOYLE, POSSESSION: BATMAN’S TREATY AND THE MATTER OF 
HISTORY 50–51 (2009). 
 36. BILLOT, supra note 34, at 108. 
 37. William Penn founded the colony of Pennsylvania pursuant to a charter granted in 1681 by 
King Charles II of England.  The Quaker proprietor is known for his fair dealings with the native 
inhabitants of his colony.  In his famous letter to the Indians, however, Penn stated that Charles II 
“hath given unto me a great Province . . . .”  WILLIAM PENN’S OWN ACCOUNT OF THE LENNI 
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lacked government sanction.38  Consequently, in his report to Lieutenant 
Governor George Arthur, John Batman argued that the Aborigines were 
“the real owners of the soil.”39  This view was not universally con-
demned—in 1837, a select committee of the British House of Commons 
would go so far as to suggest that “native inhabitants of any land have an 
incontrovertible right to their own soil.”40  It was possible, therefore, that 
the Aborigines would be recognized as the owners of their occupied 
lands.  The Port Phillip Association nevertheless sought royal confirma-
tion as a cautionary measure and formally petitioned the Crown “to grant 
to us such rights as . . . the justice of the case requires.”41 
Government officials were not persuaded by the petition.  John 
Montagu, the Colonial Secretary of Van Diemen’s Land, informed Bat-
man that “it would be contrary to British practice to recognize the trea-
ty.”42  Lieutenant Governor Arthur expressed his doubts that “a migrato-
ry savage tribe . . . could . . . confer upon the purchaser any right of pos-
session which would be recognised in our courts of law.”43  Most signifi-
cantly, when Richard Bourke, the Governor of New South Wales, was 
informed of the transaction, he officially proclaimed that “every such 
treaty, bargain, and contract with the Aboriginal Natives . . . is void and 
of no effect against the rights of the Crown . . . .”44 
In order to overcome such opposition, the Port Phillip Association 
resorted to the time-honored tradition of seeking opinions from eminent 
lawyers with expertise in colonial law.  The agent for the Port Phillip 
Association, George Mercer, solicited the views of William Burge, Dr. 
Stephen Lushington, Thomas Pemberton, and Sir William Follett.45  Un-
                                                                                                             
LENAPE OR DELAWARE INDIANS 60 (Albert Cook Myers ed., 1970) (letter, dated Oct. 18, 1681) 
(emphasis added).  Penn transacted with the Indians but relied on his royal charter as the basis for his 
title. 
 38. SERLE, supra note 31, at 59–60. 
 39. BILLOT, supra note 34, at 117 (report, dated June 25, 1835, from Batman to Lt. Governor 
George Arthur, on Van Diemen’s Land). 
 40. 2 REPORT OF THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON ABORIGINES (BRITISH SETTLEMENTS), 1837 
Imperial Blue Book No. VII. 425, at 5 (facsimile reprint 1966). 
 41. BILLOT, supra note 34, at 120. 
 42. JAMES BONWICK, JOHN BATMAN: THE FOUNDER OF VICTORIA 37 n.4 (1867) (reprint 
1973). 
 43. BONWICK, supra note 9, at 332 (letter, dated July 4, 1835, from Lt. Gov. Arthur to 
T. Spring Rice, Colonial Minister). 
 44. BILLOT, supra note 34, at 153–54 (proclamation, dated Aug. 26, 1835, of Governor 
Bourke). 
 45. William Burge served in Parliament and as Attorney General of Jamaica, and in 1838, he 
published his influential Commentaries on Colonial and Foreign Laws.  Dr. Stephen Lushington was 
a member of Parliament, and in 1838, he became a Privy Councilor.  Thomas Pemberton was viewed 
as “one of the leaders of the Chancery bar,” and William Follett had been Solicitor General in Sir 
Robert Peel’s recent administration.  EDWARD SWEETMAN, THE UNSIGNED NEW ZEALAND TREATY 
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fortunately for John Batman and his partners, the four English lawyers 
concurred that a private purchase from the Aborigines is invalid without 
the consent of the Crown.  In contrast to Lushington, Pemberton, and 
Follett, who provided little or no analysis, William Burge prepared a de-
tailed legal opinion that refers to the Swiss legal scholar, Emer de Vattel, 
the William Penn purchase, the American colonial charters, and—most 
significantly—Johnson v. McIntosh.46 
Burge’s legal opinion, dated January 16, 1836, may be the first in-
stance of someone outside the United States using Johnson to define (and 
diminish) indigenous land rights.  According to Burge, it was an ac-
cepted principle of law “that the title which discovery conferred . . . was 
that of the ultimate dominion in and sovereignty over the soil, even 
whilst it continued in the possession of the aborigines.”47  This principle, 
Burge observed, was championed by Vattel.48  It was also endorsed by 
the United States Supreme Court: 
The judgment of Chief-Justice Marshall in the case of Johnson v. 
M’Intosh, contains the elaborate opinion of the Supreme Court, that 
the Indian title was subordinate to the absolute ultimate title of the 
Government, and that the purchase made otherwise than with the 
authority of the Government was not valid.49 
Burge concluded that, as a matter of law, “the Crown can legally oust the 
Association from their possession.”50  On behalf of his client, however, 
he recommended that the Crown confirm the purchase, given “the res-
pectability of the parties engaged in it . . . and the equitable and judicious 
manner in which they conducted the intercourse with the native tri-
bes . . . .”51 
                                                                                                             
116 (1939); EDWARD L. PIERCE, 1 MEMOIR AND LETTERS OF CHARLES SUMNER, 1811–1838, at 337 
n.2 (1877). 
 46. See BONWICK, supra note 9, at 376–79 (opinion, dated Jan. 16, 1836, of William Burge); 
COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., 18 HISTORICAL RECORDS OF AUSTRALIA, SERIES 1: GOVERNORS’ 
DESPATCHES TO AND FROM ENGLAND 389–90 (1923) (opinion, dated Jan. 18, 1836, of Dr. Lushing-
ton); SWEETMAN, supra note 45, at 120 (joint opinion, dated Jan. 21, 1836, of Pemberton and Fol-
lett).  Emer de Vattel, who died in 1767, believed that the doctrine of discovery applied not only to 
uninhabited land but also to vast territories such as the New World.  In his view, “[W]hen the Na-
tions of Europe, which are too confined at home, come upon lands which the savages have no spe-
cial need of and are making no present and continuous use of, they may lawfully take possession of 
them and establish colonies in them.”  E. DE VATTEL, 3 THE LAW OF NATIONS OR THE PRINCIPLES 
OF NATURAL LAW: APPLIED TO THE CONDUCT AND TO THE AFFAIRS OF NATIONS AND OF 
SOVEREIGNS, § 209, at 85 (Charles G. Fenwick trans., 1916) (1758). 
 47. BONWICK, supra note 9, at 376 (opinion, dated Jan. 16, 1836, of William Burge). 
 48. Id. at 376–77. 
 49. Id. at 378. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 378–79; see also CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 174. 
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Not surprisingly, the Colonial Office viewed the matter differently.  
In a letter to Richard Bourke written in April of 1836, Colonial Secretary 
Lord Glenelg communicated his approval of the Governor’s edict that 
private purchases of the lands of the Aborigines were void.  According to 
Glenelg, “[W]e should consult very ill for the real welfare of that help-
less and unfortunate Race by recognising in them any right to alienate to 
private adventurers the Land of the Colony.”52  Almost as an after-
thought, he added that “such a concession would subvert the foundation 
on which all [p]roprietary rights in New South Wales at present 
rest . . . .”53 
John Batman’s health quickly declined in the last years of his life, 
during which he wore a bandage across his face to conceal his decaying 
nose.54  Although the purchase by the Port Phillip Association was held 
to be invalid as against the Crown, the members of the Association parti-
cipated in the first auction of lands in 1838.55  After losing his Australian 
lands to the Crown, and his nose to syphilis, John Batman lost his life on 
May 6, 1839.56  In 1837, Governor Bourke rejected a proposal to name 
the fledgling settlement “Batmania.”  The honor went instead to William 
Lamb, Second Viscount Melbourne, Prime Minister of the United King-
dom from 1835 to 1841.57  Today, Melbourne is the capital of the State 
of Victoria and the second most populous city in Australia. 
The case of John Batman and the Port Phillip Association provides 
a useful vantage point from which to view how possessory, ownership, 
and disposition rights in native lands can be aggregated or diffused, lead-
ing to differing conceptions of land rights.  Four possible outcomes—
three of which played into the Port Phillip Bay contest—are restated be-
low to encompass not only Australian Aborigines and American Indians 
but also other indigenous peoples: 
1. The indigenous inhabitants own the lands they occupy and also 
hold the right of possession.  In addition, the indigenous inhabi-
tants are free to sell or transfer their property rights to whom-
soever they please.  Preexisting indigenous property rights were 
unaffected by European “discovery.” 
                                                 
 52. COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTL., supra note 46, at 379 (letter, dated Apr. 13, 1836, from Lord 
Glenelg to Governor Richard Bourke). 
 53. Id.  On July 29, 1836, the government of New South Wales enacted an “Act to Restrain the 
unauthorized occupation of Crown Lands.”  BILLOT, supra note 34, at 193. 
 54. ROBYN ANNEAR, BEARBRASS: IMAGINING EARLY MELBOURNE 9 (1995). 
 55. RIDLEY, supra note 30, at 31. 
 56. SERLE, supra note 31, at 60.  Tragedy also befell Batman’s immediate family: his son 
drowned in 1845 and his wife was murdered in 1852.  RIDLEY, supra note 30, at 31–32. 
 57. ATTWOOD & DOYLE, supra note 35, at 199–200; CAMPBELL, supra note 31, at 97. 
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2. The indigenous inhabitants continue to own the lands they oc-
cupy but, after discovery, cannot sell their lands to whomsoever 
they please.  The discoverer holds a “right of preemption,” giv-
ing the discoverer the exclusive right to acquire the property 
rights of the indigenous inhabitants. 
3. The indigenous inhabitants continue to possess the lands they 
occupy but, after discovery, no longer own the lands they occu-
py.  The discoverer owns the land subject to the native title, i.e., 
the right of possession (or occupancy).  The discoverer/owner 
can transfer ownership notwithstanding the native title.  The 
discoverer/owner has the exclusive (preemptive) right to extin-
guish the native title.  Once the native title is extinguished, the 
discoverer/owner of the lands also has the right of possession. 
4. The indigenous inhabitants have no property rights.  The disco-
verer owns the land and holds the possessory right.  The indi-
genous inhabitants are trespassers (or perhaps “tenants at will”).  
When the discoverer/owner makes payments to the indigenous 
inhabitants it does so to expedite their removal, not to acquire 
property rights. 
The “unaffected” conception of indigenous land rights was only half-
heartedly urged by the Port Phillip Association, which asserted that the 
Aborigines were “in fact the owners of the soil” but nonetheless sought a 
grant of “such rights as the Crown may be advised that it possesses to the 
tracts of land in question . . . .”58   William Burge, in support of his view 
that the purchase was invalid, relied in part on Johnson v. McIntosh, 
where the Supreme Court adopted the limited possessor view of post-
discovery indigenous property rights.  Burge did not discuss Worcester v. 
Georgia, where John Marshall opted instead for the limited owner con-
ception.  Governor Bourke and the Colonial Office did not accept either 
the limited possessor or the limited owner view of indigenous land rights.  
Instead, by invoking the doctrine of terra nullius, the British government 
subscribed to the position that the Aborigines never held proprietary title 
and that Great Britain—upon settlement of the continent in 1788—
acquired the rights of ownership and possession.  The terra nullius doc-
trine can be traced back to Governor Bourke’s 1835 proclamation, which 
declared private transactions with the Aborigines to be void as against 
the rights of the Crown.  As noted by William Wallace, 
Bourke articulated the legal principle of “terra nullius” or literally 
translated, “no earth.”  The Proclamation created the legal fiction 
                                                 
 58. BILLOT, supra note 34, at 120 (report, dated June 25, 1835, from Batman to Lt. Governor 
George Arthur of Van Diemen’s Land) (emphasis added). 
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that no title in fee existed with any person prior to that date.  The ef-
fect of this pronouncement was to create, where it had not existed in 
fact, an opportunity for the Crown to claim title in fee to all of Aus-
tralia based upon the discovery doctrine.59 
In 1889, Lord Watson of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
further entrenched the terra nullius doctrine by describing New South 
Wales as “practically unoccupied, without settled inhabitants or settled 
law, at the time when it was peacefully annexed to the British domi-
nions.”60  The Crown not only asserted sovereignty over Australia, but 
also claimed absolute ownership of all the land.  The doctrine of terra 
nullius—the most extreme application of the doctrine of discovery—
would remain a cornerstone of Australian law until 1992, when it was 
finally overturned.61 
III.  SYMONDS SAYS: THE MÂORI HOLD A “MODIFIED TITLE” TO NEW 
ZEALAND 
In contrast to the acceptance in Australia of the legal fiction of terra 
nullius, British officials and jurists in New Zealand acknowledged that 
the indigenous inhabitants possessed limited property rights.  Conse-
quently, the discovery doctrine as applied in New Zealand more closely 
conformed to the American doctrine of discovery set forth in Johnson v. 
McIntosh.  Just as in America and Australia, private purchasers of Mâori 
lands argued that they received a valid title, whereas government offi-
cials declared such transactions null and void.  In 1847, the New Zealand 
Supreme Court steered a middle course and recognized a “modified” title 
retained by the Mâori.  The Queen v Symonds is the first decision outside 
the United States to cite to Johnson, and it is evident that John Marshall’s 
views were accorded great weight. 
By the time British explorer James Cook charted the coastline in 
1769, the islands of New Zealand had been inhabited for some six centu-
ries.62  The Mâori, the indigenous occupants of Aotearoa (Land of the 
                                                 
 59. William D. Wallace, M’Intosh to Mabo: Sovereignty, Challenges to Sovereignty and Reas-
sertion of Sovereign Interests, 5 CHI.-KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. Art. 5, 22 (2005), available at 
http://www.kentlaw.edu/jicl/articles/spring2005/s2005_william_wallace.pdf; see also FRANK G. 
CLARKE, THE HISTORY OF AUSTRALIA 49 (2002); SIMON YOUNG, THE TROUBLE WITH TRADITION: 
NATIVE TITLE AND CULTURAL CHANGE 13 (2008). 
 60. Cooper v. Stuart, (1889) 14 App. Cas. 286 (P.C.) 291 (appeal taken from Wales) (The 
“advice” given to the Crown by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council has the status of a court 
judgment.); see also ATTWOOD & DOYLE, supra note 35, at 72 (“[T]he legal doctrine of terra nullius 
was not formulated until the closing decades of the nineteenth century.”). 
 61. CHRISTIAN W. MCMILLEN, MAKING INDIAN LAW: THE HUALAPAI LAND CASE AND THE 
BIRTH OF ETHNOHISTORY 94–95 (2007); PETER H. RUSSELL, RECOGNIZING ABORIGINAL TITLE: THE 
MABO CASE AND INDIGENOUS RESISTANCE TO ENGLISH-SETTLER COLONIALISM 254–55 (2005). 
 62. TOM BROOKING, THE HISTORY OF NEW ZEALAND 11 (2004). 
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Long White Cloud), are a Polynesian people who migrated south around 
1180 A.D. in large, double-hulled canoes.63  Great Britain was not the 
first European nation to come upon New Zealand: the Dutch Republic 
claimed that honor in 1642 when explorer Abel Tasman sailed alongside 
the islands.64  His attempt to go ashore, however, was repulsed by the 
Mâori, who retained exclusive control of their lands for the next 150 
years.65 
The British eventually based their claim to New Zealand in part on 
discovery and in part on a treaty of cession.  On May 21, 1840, Captain 
William Hobson issued a proclamation claiming the South Island and the 
smaller Stewart Island as a consequence of their discovery by Cook in 
1769.66  At the same time, however, Hobson issued another proclama-
tion, claiming the North Island by virtue of a cession of sovereignty from 
the Mâori.67  The second proclamation was due to the fact that, on Febru-
ary 6, 1840, certain Mâori chiefs from the North Island signed the Treaty 
of Waitangi, which—according to its English version—ceded sovereign-
ty to Great Britain and gave the Crown the exclusive right to purchase 
Mâori land.68 
Although whalers, traders, and missionaries had begun to interact 
with the Mâori by the end of the eighteenth century, the European popu-
lation of New Zealand as late as 1840 was quite small (perhaps two thou-
sand) in comparison to the estimated ninety thousand Mâori inhabitants.  
In 1832, the Colonial Office appointed James Busby as “British Resi-
dent” and instructed him to promote commerce and reduce tensions be-
tween the settlers and the Mâori.  To prevent France from declaring so-
vereignty over New Zealand,69  Busby in 1835, encouraged thirty-five 
chiefs on the North Island to sign a “Declaration of the Independence of 
New Zealand,” a document that had been drafted by Busby and included 
a request that Great Britain serve as “Protector.”70 
                                                 
 63. Id. at 11–12; see infra Part VII. 
 64. ANNE SALMOND, TWO WORLDS: FIRST MEETINGS BETWEEN MAORI AND EUROPEANS, 
1642–1772, at 63–84 (1992). 
 65. Id. at 75–84. 
 66. Robert J. Miller & Jacinta Ruru, An Indigenous Lens into Comparative Law: The Doctrine 
of Discovery in the United States and New Zealand, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 849, 879 (2009). 
 67. Id. at 880. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. (noting that by 1839, “the French had a foothold in parts of the South Island”). 
 70. BROOKING, supra note 62, at 37; W. P. MORRELL, BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY IN THE AGE 
OF PEEL AND RUSSELL 103 (1930) (reprint 1966); GUY H. SCHOLEFIELD, CAPTAIN WILLIAM 
HOBSON: FIRST GOVERNOR OF NEW ZEALAND 61–62 (1934) [hereinafter SCHOLEFIELD, CAPTAIN 
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THE GREAT POWERS FROM THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 313 (1920) (full text of the Declaration). 
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At about this time, Edward Gibbon Wakefield formed the New 
Zealand Association.71  The Association gave way in 1838 to the New 
Zealand Company, a joint-stock land company not unlike the Illinois and 
Wabash Land Company.72  Beginning in May of 1839, the Company sent 
settlers to New Zealand with a promise that they would receive title to 
Company lands purchased from the Mâori.73  When the settlers arrived at 
Cook Strait in September, William Wakefield, Edward Gibbon Wake-
field’s younger brother, negotiated with local Mâori chiefs to purchase 
large tracts of land.74  He obtained deeds from the Ngati Toa and Te Ati 
Awa that purported to sell a considerable portion of New Zealand, in-
cluding territory that did not belong to them.75 
The private purchases of Mâori land quickly became an enormous 
problem for the Crown.  According to one estimate, by 1840, nine parties 
had laid claim to 56,654,000 acres.76  Since the size of New Zealand was 
considered to be 56 million acres, a member of the House of Commons 
noted that the transactions had left “the Natives 654,000 acres less than 
nothing.”77  In 1839, the Colonial Office appointed Captain Hobson as 
British consul to New Zealand and instructed him to treat with the Mâori 
for the recognition of British sovereignty over “the whole or any part of 
those islands which they may be willing to place under Her Majesty’s 
dominion.”78  But because it was deemed “scarcely possible” to treat 
with the “wild savages in the Southern Islands,” Hobson was also autho-
rized to claim that portion of New Zealand “by right of Discovery.”79  
The Colonial Office further instructed Hobson to inform British settlers 
in New Zealand “that Her Majesty will not acknowledge as valid any 
title to land which either has been, or shall be hereafter acquired, in that 
country which is not either derived from, or confirmed by, a grant to be 
made in Her Majesty’s name and on her behalf.”80   The Mâori signed the 
                                                 
 71. MORRELL, supra note 70, at 103. 
 72. Id. at 104. 
 73. Id. at 105. 
 74. Id. at 105–06. 
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Treaty of Waitangi at the Bay of Islands on February 6, 1840, and Hob-
son issued his annexation proclamations on the twenty-first of May.81 
New Zealand is situated more than twelve hundred miles from Aus-
tralia and on the other side of the world from England.  Consequently, as 
events unfolded in 1840, actions were taken in each location with imper-
fect knowledge of what was happening elsewhere.  For instance, in Janu-
ary 1840, Governor George Gipps of New South Wales issued a procla-
mation, similar to the proclamation issued by Hobson, declaring that 
prior purchases of Mâori land by British subjects would be deemed valid 
only if confirmed by the Crown and that all future unauthorized private 
purchases would be considered null and void.82  The next month, Gover-
nor Gipps invited visiting Mâori chiefs to sign a treaty similar to the 
Treaty of Waitangi.83  The chiefs declined and instead went the next day 
to the office of Sydney lawyer William Charles Wentworth, where they 
proceeded to convey the South Island and most of the adjacent islands to 
five individuals.84  The private purchase of approximately twenty million 
acres, which was contrary to Gipps’s proclamation, was placed in further 
jeopardy in May when Gipps introduced a bill in the New South Wales 
legislature to invalidate unauthorized purchases of Mâori land.85 
Wentworth appeared before the Legislative Council and challenged 
the legality of the bill and Gipps’s proclamation.  He argued that private 
purchases made prior to the Treaty of Waitangi were valid and that 
Gipps’s proclamation was issued without legal authority.86  In response 
to the claim that the Mâori lacked the capacity and authority to dispose 
of their lands, Wentworth noted that “the annals of America” contained 
“numerous instances of purchases made from the natives, sometimes by 
the Government and sometimes by individuals.”87  The government’s 
self-proclaimed right of preemption, Wentworth further contended, was 
                                                 
 81. EVISON, supra note 75, at 31–37; Mark Hickford, “Settling Some Very Important Prin-
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the product of legislative enactment and, consequently, “until such a law 
is made and passed by this Council, the right of British subjects to buy 
land from the natives is as indisputable as the right of the natives to sell it 
to them.”88 
Gipps replied eight days later, on July 9, 1840.  He asserted that the 
Mâori “have not the right of granting the soil to individuals because they 
themselves have not individual possession.”89  What gives the right of 
disposition, Gipps argued, “is not independence, but civilisation,”90 and 
when an uncivilized country is possessed by a civilized power, “the right 
of pre-emption of the soil belongs to that power; the titles of the native 
tribes are extinguished, and rest with the governing power.”91  In support 
of his position, Gipps noted that “eminent” British lawyers had declared 
a similar transaction—the 1835 Port Phillip Association purchase—
invalid without Crown consent.92  Gipps also quoted passages from the 
Commentaries of Joseph Story and James Kent, and stressed that the sub-
ject at hand “was discussed at great length in the celebrated case of 
Johnston v. McIntosh [sic] . . . .”93 
In his rebuttal, Wentworth described the right of preemption as an 
“arrogant claim,”94 but had to concede Gipps’s main point: the United 
States Supreme Court had indeed held that, following European discov-
ery, American Indians retained only a “qualified dominion or right of 
occupancy.”95  Wentworth argued, however, that “in this enlightened 
age” the Legislative Council should reject the “principle of usurpation” 
that had diminished native land rights in the New World.96  He also 
pointed out that Chief Justice Marshall expressed doubts, in Worcester v. 
Georgia, about applying the doctrine of discovery to inhabited lands.97 
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Similar arguments appeared in New Zealand newspapers.  The “old 
settlers” of New Zealand—who acquired their lands directly from the 
Mâori—were naturally sympathetic to Wentworth’s arguments, although 
they distanced themselves from his involvement in the exorbitant pur-
chase of the entire South Island.98  On August 6, 1840, the editor of the 
New Zealand Advertiser and Bay of Islands Gazette exclaimed that 
“[d]iscovery may give one Nation a priority of claim to another, but it 
cannot establish an absolute claim, where there are aboriginal inhabi-
tants.”99  The Gazette took a different approach, arguing that the Crown 
admitted that the Mâori possessed sovereign rights—including the power 
to alienate property—when government officials signed the Treaty of 
Waitangi.100  On October 29, 1840, an individual using the pseudonym 
Civis published a letter in the Advertiser, arguing that quotations “from 
obsolete American writers” could not alter the fact that “our possessions 
have been acquired in a foreign country, at a time, too, when its indepen-
dence was unequivocally recognised . . . .”101  In another issue, Civis as-
serted (with undoubted self-interest) that “the rights of Native proper-
ty . . . are as inviolable as the decrees of eternal truth.”102 
Meanwhile, the meaning and relevance of Johnson v. McIntosh—
and how it applied to the New Zealand context—was being discussed in 
England.  In the summer of 1840, a select committee of the House of 
Commons investigated and reported on the state of affairs in New Zeal-
and.103  Edward Gibbons Wakefield testified that, if the Crown had 
claimed the entirety of New Zealand by right of discovery, it would have 
had “an absolute right of pre-emption to the land.”104  The preemptive 
right of the European discoverer of new lands, Wakefield noted, was “a 
well-understood principle of law in America, where the subject has very 
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often come before the courts . . . .”105  To drive his point home, Wake-
field returned the next day and presented the committee with the reported 
decision in the case of “Johnstone v. Mackintosh [sic].”106 
Ultimately, in its report, the Committee stated that the United States 
Supreme Court had declared “as a principle of international law” that 
discovery gives title “as against all foreign powers,” as well as “the sole 
right to purchase the soil from the natives . . . .”107  According to the 
Committee, when the British government acknowledged the indepen-
dence of the Mâori, it deviated from “the wisdom of this principle” and 
tacitly conceded the right of the natives to sell their lands to British sub-
jects without Crown approval.108  The Committee recommended that the 
Crown should claim “the exclusive right of pre-emption” over all lands 
that the Mâori “may be disposed to alienate.”109  This right of preemption 
had been previously granted in the English version of the Treaty of Wai-
tangi.110  Regardless, when Queen Victoria issued a royal charter in No-
vember 1840, New Zealand became a separate colony,111 and in 1841 the 
New Zealand Legislative Council, following the Committee’s recom-
mendation, enacted a Land Claims Ordinance that affirmed and codified 
the right of preemption.112 
In the interval between Wakefield’s testimony and the issuance of 
the report of the select committee, the Colonial Office also examined the 
significance of Johnson v. McIntosh.  The Colonial Secretary at this time 
was Lord John Russell, and his parliamentary under-secretary was Ro-
bert Vernon Smith.  On July 28, 1840, the permanent under-secretary, 
James Stephen, prepared a legal memorandum for Smith that set forth 
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Stephen’s understanding of Marshall’s decision.113  Stephen noted that 
Johnson v. McIntosh held that a native grant “would confer on the gran-
tee no valid Title in defiance of a Title derived under a grant from the 
United States.”114  Stephen did not agree with Marshall’s opinion and 
argued that the Johnson rule should not constrain Mâori property rights: 
Such is American Law.  The British Law in Canada is far more 
humane, for there the Crown purchases of the Indians before it 
grants to its own subjects. 
Whatever may be the ground occupied by international jurists 
they never forget the policy and interests of their own Country.  
Their business is to give to rapacity and injustice, the most decorous 
veil which legal ingenuity can weave. . . .   Mr. Marshall, great as 
he was, was still an American and adjudicated against the rights of 
the Indians.115 
Stephen’s reluctance to endorse Johnson v. McIntosh was not shared by 
all members of the House of Commons.  In 1844, a new select committee 
recommended considering the ownership of unoccupied (or “waste”) 
lands in New Zealand as vested in the Crown.  The committee report 
stated that one of the “general principles” of colonial law is that “uncivi-
lized inhabitants of any country have but a qualified dominion over it, or 
a right of occupancy only . . . .”116  The following year, Sir Howard 
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Douglas of Liverpool challenged the assertion during a debate in the 
House of Commons.  Douglas argued that “this new fundamental prin-
ciple of Colonial law” was based on “certain adjudications” that hold 
that the American Indians “have no other property to the soil . . . than 
that of mere occupancy; and that the complete title to their lands vests in 
the Government . . . .”117  In his view, these “adjudications”—which cer-
tainly included Johnson v. McIntosh—were “totally inconsistent with a 
strict observance of the stipulations of the Treaty of Waitangi” and, if 
adopted, would “warrant a repetition of the worst atrocities of former 
times . . . .”118 
While the House of Commons could not reach a consensus over the 
relevance and meaning of Johnson v. McIntosh, the case was endorsed in 
1847 by the New Zealand Supreme Court in The Queen v Symonds.119  
The Symonds case was a feigned dispute designed to produce a judicial 
determination regarding indigenous land rights.  In 1844, Robert Fitz-
Roy, who had succeeded William Hobson as governor of New Zealand, 
issued two proclamations that purported to waive the Crown’s preemp-
tive right to purchase Mâori lands.120  Pursuant to the second proclama-
tion, individuals who obtained “waiver certificates” were authorized to 
purchase native land for a payment to the Crown of just one penny per 
acre.121  Shortly thereafter, FitzRoy was replaced by Sir George Grey, 
who had been serving as the Governor of South Australia.  Grey doubted 
the authority of FitzRoy to waive the right of preemption and questioned 
the validity of the resulting private purchases.122  Consequently, a dispute 
was contrived to test the legality of the preemption “waiver” certificates.  
The former Secretary to the Land Commission, C. Hunter McIntosh, ob-
tained a preemption certificate that enabled him to purchase a small tract 
of land from the Mâori.  Thereafter, Governor Grey deeded the same 
land by a Crown grant to his private secretary, Captain J.J. Symonds.  
With the Governor’s permission, C.H. McIntosh then used the name of 
                                                                                                             
the Crown.  See generally PETER ADAMS, FATAL NECESSITY: BRITISH INTERVENTION IN NEW 
ZEALAND, 1830–1847, at 185–88 (1977). 
 117. A CORRECTED REPORT OF THE DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ON THE 17TH, 18TH, 
AND 19TH OF JUNE ON THE STATE OF NEW ZEALAND AND THE CASE OF THE NEW ZEALAND 
COMPANY 124 (London: 1845) (emphasis added) (remarks by Sir Howard Douglas, delivered on 
June 18, 1845). 
 118. Id.  Other members of Parliament endorsed the limited possessor conception of native 
land rights, including Charles Buller, who stated that “our law . . . recognises occupancy as the sole 
property which savages could possess.”  Id. at 22. 
 119. The Queen v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387. 
 120. Hickford, supra note 81, at 4. 
 121. Id. at 4–5. 
 122. Id. at 4; PAUL MCHUGH, THE MÂORI MAGNA CARTA: NEW ZEALAND LAW AND THE 
TREATY OF WAITANGI 109 (1991). 
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the Queen to bring suit upon a writ of scire facias,123 to set aside the 
grant.124  Thus, whereas William McIntosh in Johnson relied on a patent 
deed, and challenged a prior purchase of native lands, C. Hunter McIn-
tosh in Symonds was the prior purchaser of native lands who challenged 
a Crown grant. 
Both members of the New Zealand Supreme Court, Justice Henry 
Samuel Chapman and Chief Justice William Martin, held that Governor 
FitzRoy’s proclamations were unlawful, and Martin concurred with 
Chapman’s statement that private purchases of Mâori lands are “good as 
against the Native seller, but not against the Crown.”125  As Simon 
Young has noted, “[E]merging US principles played a central role in 
[Justice Chapman’s] own reasoning, and [Chief Justice Mar-
tin] . . . quoted commentaries repeating the crucial passage from Johnson 
v M’Intosh which recognised the Native Americans’ legal and just claim 
to retain possession of their lands . . . .”126  The Symonds decision thus 
“introduced the Marshall Court jurisprudence of the United States to im-
perial New Zealand . . . .”127 
The United States Supreme Court in Johnson could have simply 
held that the private purchases violated the Royal Proclamation of 1763, 
which prohibited British subjects from purchasing Indian lands west of 
the Allegheny Mountains without government approval.128  Likewise, the 
                                                 
 123. Scire facias (“that you make known”) has been defined as “a judicial writ founded upon 
some matter of record, and requiring the person against whom it is brought to show cause why the 
party bringing it should have the advantage of such record, or (as in the case of a scire facias to 
repeal letters patent) why the record should not be annulled and vacated.”  HENRY JAMES 
HOLTHOUSE & HENRY PENINGTON, A NEW LAW DICTIONARY 383 (1999) (1847). 
 124. The full title of the suit is The Queen (On the Prosecution of C.H. McIntosh) v Symonds.  
The land at issue was a small island near Auckland.  See MCMILLEN, supra note 61, at 93 (“Like 
Johnson, Symonds involved no native people.”); John William Tate, Pre-Wi Parata: Early Native 
Title Cases In New Zealand, 11 WAIKATO L. REV. 112, 139 n.60 (2003). 
 125. Symonds, (1847) NZPCC at 390.  Henry Samuel Chapman was born in England but lived 
in Canada from 1823 to 1835, when he returned to England.  He joined the legal profession in 1840, 
the same year he founded The New Zealand Journal.  Chapman immigrated to New Zealand in 1843 
and became a judge of the Supreme Court of New Zealand.  Spiller, supra note 81, at 257; R. S. 
Neale, Chapman, Henry Samuel (1803–1881), in 3 AUSTRALIAN DICTIONARY OF BIOGRAPHY, 
1851–1890, at 380–82 (N. B. Nairn et al. eds., 1969).  William Martin was born in England, edu-
cated at Cambridge, and called to the bar in 1836.  He became the first Chief Justice of New Zealand 
in 1841.  G. P. Barton, Martin, William, 1807?-1880, in 1 THE DICTIONARY OF NEW ZEALAND 
BIOGRAPHY, 1769–1869, at 277–79 (1990). 
 126. YOUNG, supra note 59, at 169 (footnotes omitted). 
 127. Hickford, supra note 81, at 2.  Martin quoted Kent’s Commentaries on American Law, 
which includes several passages from Johnson v. McIntosh.  Symonds, (1847) NZPCC at 393–94.  
Chapman cited Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831), referred to Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. 
87 (1810), and also cited James Kent’s discussion of Johnson and the doctrine of discovery.  Sy-
monds, (1847) NZPCC at 388, 390, 392. 
 128. SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 
1606–1775, at 267–72 (William MacDonald ed., 1914). 
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New Zealand Supreme Court could have resolved Symonds by holding 
that the purchase of Mâori land violated the 1841 Land Claims Ordin-
ance, which transformed the Crown’s right of preemption into positive 
law.129  Instead, Chapman and Martin followed the example set by Mar-
shall and seized the opportunity to discuss the nature (and existence) of 
indigenous land rights.  In light of the numerous land transactions with 
the Mâori, and the promises exchanged in the Treaty of Waitangi, it was 
evident that the New Zealand Supreme Court would not invoke the terra 
nullius doctrine and hold that the Mâori, like the Australian Aborigines, 
could not convey property rights because they lacked property rights.130  
On the other hand, Justice Chapman flatly rejected the unaffected con-
ception of indigenous land rights, noting that the right of preemption—
“though it operates only as a restraint upon the purchasing capacity of the 
Queen’s European subjects”—is nevertheless “incompatible with that 
full and absolute dominion over the lands which they occupy, which we 
call an estate in fee.”131  The Mâori, following discovery, were not free to 
make any bargain or cession of lands whenever and to whomsoever they 
pleased. 
Chapman wavered, however, between the limited possessor and li-
mited owner conceptions of indigenous land rights.  Without directly 
mentioning Johnson v. McIntosh, he acknowledged the former view that 
the discovering nation, as against its own subjects, has “the full and ab-
solute dominion over the soil, as a necessary consequence of territorial 
jurisdiction.”132  On the other hand, Chapman described the Crown’s 
ownership as “technical seisin” and stated that the Mâori hold a “mod-
ified title” that “is not theoretically inconsistent with the Queen’s seisin 
in fee as against her European subjects.”133  After affirming Mâori abori-
ginal title, Chapman did not further define the precise nature of the mod-
ified title of the natives: 
Even abstaining from regarding the Queen’s territorial right . . . as 
an actual seisin in fee . . . and regarding it in the view most favoura-
ble to the claimant’s case, as . . . a mere possibility of seisin, I am of 
the opinion that it is not a fit subject to waiver either generally by 
                                                 
 129. The 1841 Land Claims Ordinance states that “all titles to land in the said Colony of New 
Zealand which are held or claimed by virtue of purchase . . . from the chiefs or other individu-
als . . . of the aboriginal tribes . . . which are not or may not hereafter be allowed by her Majes-
ty . . . are . . . absolutely null and void.”  Symonds, (1847) NZPCC at 394. 
 130. EVISON, supra note 75, at 35 (“terra nullius was not applied to New Zealand”). 
 131. Symonds, (1847) NZPCC at 391 (Chapman, J). 
 132. Id. at 387 (emphasis added). 
 133. Id. at 388, 391. 
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Proclamation, or specially by such a certificate as Mr. McIntosh 
holds.134 
Aboriginal title was thus afforded judicial recognition in New Zeal-
and only twenty-four years after Johnson v. McIntosh.  There was no 
appeal of Symonds to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, yet 
the decision was added to a collection of New Zealand Privy Council 
Cases due to “its importance in New Zealand constitutional law.”135  Al-
though cognizant of the Treaty of Waitangi, the Symonds court “came to 
its decision not by interpreting the treaty but by referring to the general 
rights of aboriginal peoples in international law.”136  Justice Chapman, in 
particular, was influenced by John Marshall’s “Indian” decisions: in his 
opinion he suggests at one point that the Mâori are “under a species of 
guardianship,” and even echoes Marshall by acknowledging that the 
“rule laid down . . . may be apparently against what are called abstract or 
speculative rights.”137  According to Symonds, the Mâori of New Zealand 
retained their customary rights to use and occupy their lands, but their 
title was necessarily “modified” when Great Britain claimed sovereignty 
over the islands and acquired the preemptive right to extinguish the na-
tive title.138 
IV.  ABORIGINAL TITLE IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY CANADA: 
USUFRUCTUARY OR ILLUSORY? 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 required British subjects in North 
America to obtain the “special leave and licence” of the Crown in order 
to purchase native lands.139  The Proclamation applied to native lands 
located west of the Appalachian Mountains, such as those of the Illinois 
and Piankeshaw tribes, and also to native lands in Canada both before 
                                                 
 134. Id. at 387–88, 392; see also Spiller, supra note 81, at 262 (discussing how Chapman did 
not decide whether the Crown held “an actual seisin in fee as against her European subjects” or a 
“mere possibility of seisin” prior to the extinction of the native title). 
 135. NEW ZEALAND PRIVY COUNCIL CASES, 1840–1932, at x (1938); see also Hamar Foster, 
Letting Go the Bone: The Idea of Indian Title in British Columbia, 1849–1927, in 6 ESSAYS IN THE 
HISTORY OF CANADIAN LAW: BRITISH COLUMBIA AND THE YUKON 28, 38–39 (Hamar Foster & 
John McLaren eds., 1995). 
 136. BELGRAVE, supra note 106, at 70. 
 137. Compare Symonds, (1847) NZPCC at 388, 391, with Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 
(5 Pet.) 1, 13 (1831) (The Indians’ “relation to the United States resembles that of a ward to his 
guardian.”), and Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823) (“We will not enter into 
the controversy, whether agriculturists, merchants, and manufacturers, have a right, on abstract prin-
ciples, to expel hunters from the territory they possess, or to contract their limits.”). 
 138. MCMILLEN, supra note 61, at 93; KENT MCNEIL, COMMON LAW ABORIGINAL TITLE 190 
(1989). 
 139. SELECT CHARTERS AND OTHER DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 
1606–1775, at 267–72 (William MacDonald ed., 1914). 
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and after the American Revolution.140  The geographic scope of the Proc-
lamation in Canada, however, provoked debate, and its legal effect on 
native rights was controverted.  Did the King, by his proclamation, grant 
rights or acknowledge preexisting rights?  Is the Proclamation the 
source—or a source—of aboriginal land rights in Canada?  In western 
Canada, government officials argued that British Columbia was not sub-
ject to the Proclamation and relied instead on the terra nullius doctrine to 
deny the existence of any native title.141  In eastern Canada, the existence 
and scope of native property rights was addressed in the case of St. Ca-
therine’s Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen.142  In St. Catherine’s Mil-
ling, the judges pondered the meaning and relevance of both Johnson v. 
McIntosh and the 1763 Proclamation, and recognized an aboriginal land 
right that is “personal and usufructuary” in nature.143  The result was two 
divergent views of the property rights of the First Nations of Canada. 
Aboriginal land rights were denied in British Columbia in the nine-
teenth century.  The Hudson Bay Company administered much of this 
part of British North America until the 1850s, when gold was discovered 
along the Fraser River.144  The non-Indian population surged, and in Au-
gust of 1858, the Crown created the colony of British Columbia.145  The 
governor of the new colony, James Douglas, also served as governor of 
the colony of Vancouver Island.146  Douglas came to western Canada in 
1820 to work in the fur trade and soon thereafter married a woman with 
Cree Indian ancestry.147  Between 1850 and 1854, he negotiated several 
treaties that acquired large portions of Vancouver territory from the na-
tive peoples.148 
As governor of British Columbia, however, James Douglas stopped 
recognizing native land rights and instead instituted a policy whereby the 
                                                 
 140. Id. 
 141. FRANK JAMES TESTER & PETER KULCHYSKI, TAMMARNIIT (MISTAKES): INUIT 
RELOCATION IN THE EASTERN ARCTIC, 1939–63, at 34 (1994). 
 142. The decisions of the Ontario Court of Chancery, Ontario Court of Appeal, Supreme Court 
of Canada, and Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the St. Catherine’s Milling litigation are 
collected in 4 CASES DECIDED ON THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, 1867, IN THE PRIVY COUNCIL, 
THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA AND THE PROVINCIAL COURTS 107–240 (John R. Cartwright ed., 
1892) [hereinafter 4 CASES DECIDED ON THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICAN ACT, 1867]. 
 143. St. Catherine’s Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen, (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.) 54, 58 
(appeal taken from Can.). 
 144. PAUL TENNANT, ABORIGINAL PEOPLES AND POLITICS: THE INDIAN LAND QUESTION IN 
BRITISH COLUMBIA, 1849–1989, at 17–25 (1991). 
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. 
 148. JOAN G. FAIRWEATHER, A COMMON HUNGER: LAND RIGHTS IN CANADA AND SOUTH 
AFRICA 46–47 (2006); DEREK PETHICK, JAMES DOUGLAS: SERVANT OF TWO EMPIRES 77–79 
(1969). 
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Crown’s lands were set aside as “reserves” for the indigenous inhabi-
tants.149  It is unlikely that local officials were aware that the United 
States Supreme Court had recognized Indian title, and there is no indica-
tion that Douglas felt constrained by the 1763 Proclamation.150  For rea-
sons that are not entirely clear, Douglas applied the terra nullius doc-
trine—the most extreme version of the doctrine of discovery—to British 
Columbia.  As Stuart Banner points out, the land was deemed to be un-
owned by the native peoples and, “as in Australia, the government simp-
ly allocated the land to settlers without obtaining the consent of its pre-
vious occupants.”151 
In 1867, Canada was formed as a federal dominion pursuant to the 
British North America Act.152  Four years later, British Columbia joined 
the federation as its sixth province.153  Local officials, however, contin-
ued to deny the existence of aboriginal land rights.  “British Colum-
bia . . . appears to be treating its Indian subjects with great harshness,” 
the Canadian Governor-General complained in 1874, and “does not rec-
ognize any obligation to extinguish the Indian title, before dealing with 
the Crown lands . . . .”154  Three years later, the Governor-General res-
tated his displeasure, noting that “the whites in British Columbia have 
simply claimed the land as their own . . . .”155  In 1886, the Chief Justice 
of the Supreme Court of British Columbia, Sir Matthew Baillie Begbie, 
held that Indians had no rights except as “the grace and intelligent bene-
volence of the Crown may allow.”156  The following year, when Nisga’a 
                                                 
 149. TENNANT, supra note 144, at 29–30. 
 150. Foster, supra note 135, at 36; see also PETHICK, supra note 148, at 202–03; Wiessner, 
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 154. DUFFERIN-CARNARVON CORRESPONDENCE, 1874–1878, at 112 (C. W. de Kiewiet & 
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Dec. 21, 1874, from Dufferin to Carnavon) (British Columbia residents “should be required to extin-
guish the Indian title before assuming possession of the lands . . . .”). 
 155. Id. at 361 (letter, dated July 27, 1877, from Dufferin to Carnarvon) (emphasis added). 
 156. A.G. & I.B. Nash v. John Tait (4 Metlakatla Indians) (unpublished), Begbie Bench Books, 
Vol. 13, 28 Oct. 1886 (B.C. Archives and Records Service), quoted in Foster, supra note 135, at 66; 
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and Tsimshian chiefs met with the provincial Premier, William Smithe, 
Smithe declined to negotiate treaties that would recognize their rights to 
land and self-government.157  Instead, he characterized the Indians prior 
to European contact as “little better than the wild beasts of the field” and 
declared that, as a consequence of discovery, the land “all belongs to the 
Queen.”158  At a subsequent meeting with government officials, a Nis-
ga’a chief retorted that the land “is ours to give to the Queen, and we 
don’t understand how she could have it to give to us.”159 
In contrast to British Columbia, the Johnson v. McIntosh decision 
did have an impact on aboriginal land rights in eastern Canada.  The 
leading nineteenth-century Canadian case on native title is St. Cathe-
rine’s Milling & Lumber Co. v. The Queen.160  It is surprising that the 
issue was not litigated in Canada until the 1880s, some forty years after 
Symonds was decided in New Zealand and over sixty years after Johnson 
was handed down in the United States.  It is not surprising, however, that 
when the Canadian courts and the Privy Council finally addressed the 
issue of Indian title, they gave no consideration to the views of the indi-
genous peoples of Canada.  As in both Johnson and Symonds, St. Cathe-
rine’s Milling did not involve the putative tribal grantor.161 
The dispute concerned an 1873 treaty between the Ojibway Indians 
and the Canadian (Dominion) government.162  According to the Domi-
nion, the Indians retained the right to hunt and fish but otherwise ceded 
their title to the land in the treaty, which thereafter enabled the Dominion 
to lease the land to the St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company.163  
The Province of Ontario disagreed, arguing that it owned the land.  Ac-
cording to the Province, the Ojibways only held a “usufructuary” right,164 
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which allowed them to use the lands that were owned by the Province.165  
In the ensuing litigation, the lawyers and jurists on both sides argued that 
their view of indigenous land rights had been endorsed by the United 
States Supreme Court in Johnson v. McIntosh.166 
The suit was brought in the Ontario Court of Chancery.  Chancellor 
John Boyd agreed with the Province of Ontario that logging by the St. 
Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company would constitute a trespass.  
According to the Chancellor, Indians at the time of discovery were no-
madic “heathens and barbarians” who lacked “any proprietary title to the 
soil . . . .”167  In support of this view, Boyd cited a 1675 legal opinion in 
which eminent English lawyers declared that the discovery of barbarian 
lands gave the discovering nation the “Right of Soyle & Govermt of 
place . . . .”168  Boyd then asserted that in Johnson v. McIntosh, Chief 
Justice Marshall “has concisely stated the same law of the mother coun-
try, which the United States inherited, and applied with such modifica-
tions as were necessitated by the change of government to their dealings 
with the Indians.”169 
The Ontario Court of Appeal (1886) and the Supreme Court of 
Canada (1887) agreed that the Province held legal title to the lands in 
question.  In one of four opinions handed down by the Court of Appeal, 
Justice George Burton noted the “very interesting and instructive” dis-
cussion in Johnson of the relationship of “the Indian right of occupancy” 
to “the absolute title of the Crown.”170  Without mentioning Worcester v. 
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Georgia by name, Burton acknowledged that other American decisions 
“would seem to place the so called Indian title on a higher footing” but 
argued that Johnson was better reasoned.171  Justices Samuel Strong and 
Jean-Thomas Taschereau of the Supreme Court also cited Johnson with 
approval,172 and Chief Justice William J. Ritchie quoted from Joseph Sto-
ry’s discussion of the discovery doctrine in his Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States.173  “I think the Crown owns the soil of 
all unpatented lands,” Ritchie held, “the Indians possessing only the right 
of occupancy, and the Crown possessing the legal title subject to that 
occupancy, with the absolute exclusive right to extinguish the Indian title 
either by conquest or by purchase . . . .”174 
The St. Catherine’s Milling dispute was appealed to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council in London, which upheld the decision of 
the Supreme Court of Canada.  On December 12, 1888, the Council af-
firmed the prior decisions and accepted Ontario’s contention that “before 
and after the treaty of 1873 the title to the lands in suit was in the Crown 
and not in the Indians.”175  Lord Watson, on behalf of the Council, re-
jected the notion that the Ojibway had been “the owners in fee simple of 
the territory which they surrendered” and instead held that the Crown 
“has all along had a present proprietary estate in the land, upon which the 
Indian title was a mere burden.”176  Rather than constituting an owner-
ship right, “the tenure of the Indians was a personal and usufructuary 
right, dependent upon the good will of the Sovereign.”177  As defined in 
Roman and civil law, a “usufruct” is the “right to use and enjoy the fruits 
of another’s property for a period without damaging or diminishing 
it . . . .”178  In this regard, the Privy Council decision, as articulated by 
Lord Watson, defines Indian title in a manner consistent with the limited 
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 176. Id. at 58.  Lord William Watson was appointed Solicitor General for Scotland in 1874, 
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possessor view of indigenous land rights set forth in Johnson v. McIn-
tosh.179 
With respect to the source of Indian title, however, Lord Watson 
parted ways with John Marshall and suggested it had been granted to the 
natives by the King in the 1763 Proclamation.  “Their possession,” Wat-
son observed, “can only be ascribed to the general provisions made by 
the royal proclamation . . . .”180  As noted by Kent McNeil, because 
“Lord Watson based his remarks respecting the nature of the Indians’ 
interest on the terms of the Royal Proclamation,” the Privy Council deci-
sion has “little bearing on the question of indigenous land rights in terri-
tories where the Proclamation has never applied.”181  It was only in 1973 
that the Supreme Court of Canada recognized aboriginal title as a legal 
right that was not dependent on the Royal Proclamation, but which in-
stead was derived from historic occupation and possession of tribal 
lands. 
V.  CANADA TODAY: ABORIGINAL TITLE AS A COMMON LAW AND 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 
William Smithe’s 1887 declaration that “the land all belongs to the 
Queen” did not dissuade the Nisga’a Nation from seeking vindication of 
its rights.  In 1967, Frank Calder and other Nisga’a leaders sued for “a 
declaration that the aboriginal title, otherwise known as the Indian title, 
of the plaintiffs to their ancient tribal territory . . . has never been lawful-
ly extinguished.”182  In the 1973 decision of Calder v. British Columbia 
(Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada declared that the indi-
genous inhabitants of Canada held an aboriginal title at the time the 
Crown acquired sovereignty.183  Contrary to statements by Lord Watson 
in St. Catherine’s Milling, aboriginal title was not dependent upon the 
1763 Proclamation; it rested instead—as noted by Justice Wilfred Jud-
son—on the fact that “when the settlers came, the Indians were there, 
organised in societies and occupying the land as their forefathers had 
done for centuries.”184  Whereas St. Catherine’s Milling is “the most sig-
                                                 
 179. FAIRWEATHER, supra note 148, at 61 (“Chief Justice Marshall’s . . . approach to aborigin-
al title was formally adopted by the Canadian government in 1880 on the approval of the British 
Privy Council in Westminster.”). 
 180. St. Catherine’s Milling, 14 App. Cas. at 49 (emphasis added). 
 181. MCNEIL, supra note 138, at 273–74; see also TENNANT, supra note 144, at 214; YOUNG, 
supra note 59, at 25 (“The reasoning in the St. Catherine’s decisions left some uncertainty as to 
whether the Aboriginal interest had a source beyond the imperial Royal Proclamation of 
1763 . . . .”). 
 182. Calder v. British Columbia (Att’y Gen.), [1973] S.C.R. 313, ¶ 80 (Can.). 
 183. Id. ¶ 26. 
 184. Id.; see also Bell & Asch, supra note 170, at 48; MCHUGH, supra note 122, at 127.  Al-
though the Nisga’a Nation established the existence of aboriginal title, it did not prevail in the litiga-
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nificant early Canadian case on the question of the legal status of abori-
ginal title,” Calder is “[t]he foundation case on common law aboriginal 
title in Canada.”185 
The impact of Johnson v. McIntosh on the Calder case is evident.  
At various points in his opinion, Justice Emmett Hall described Johnson 
as “the outstanding judicial pronouncement on the subject of Indian 
rights,” the case “most frequently quoted with approval dealing with the 
nature of aboriginal rights,” and “the locus classicus of the principles 
governing aboriginal title.”186  Justice Hall summarized the “dominant 
and recurring proposition” of Marshall’s opinion as follows: 
[T]hat on discovery or on conquest the aborigines of newly-found 
lands were conceded to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a 
legal as well as a just claim to retain possession of it and to use it 
according to their own discretion, but their rights to complete sove-
reignty as independent nations were necessarily diminished and 
their power to dispose of the soil on their own will to whomsoever 
they pleased was denied by the original fundamental principle that 
discovery or conquest gave exclusive title to those who made it.187 
Hall and the other justices in Calder also cited prior decisions, such as 
Symonds and St. Catherine’s Milling, that likewise considered Marshall’s 
views in Johnson.188 
Like Johnson, the Calder decision recognized a preexisting abori-
ginal title but held that the “exact nature and extent of the Indian right or 
title does not need to be precisely stated in this litigation.”189  In Hamlet 
of Baker Lake v. Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development, 
however, Justice Patrick Mahoney of the Federal Court of Canada cited 
Johnson and other cases to expand on the subject of aboriginal title in 
Canada, holding that, in order to establish an aboriginal title “cognizable 
at common law,” the indigenous peoples must prove that (1) their ances-
tors were members of an organized society; (2) the peoples occupied the 
specific territory over which they assert the aboriginal title; (3) the occu-
pation was to the exclusion of other organized societies; and (4) the oc-
cupation was an established fact at the time sovereignty was asserted by 
                                                                                                             
tion.  The British Columbia Supreme Court had held that any and all aboriginal land rights held by 
the Nation were extinguished when British Columbia became the sixth Canadian province in 1871.  
This judgment was upheld, for different reasons, by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada.  See 
FAIRWEATHER, supra note 148, at 98. 
 185. SHAUNNAGH DORSETT & LEE GODDEN, A GUIDE TO OVERSEAS PRECEDENTS OF 
RELEVANCE TO NATIVE TITLE 77 (1998). 
 186. Calder, [1973] S.C.R. ¶ 121. 
 187. Id. ¶ 124. 
 188. Id. ¶ 8 (Judson, J.), ¶ 117 (Hall, J.), ¶ 185 (Pigeon, J.). 
 189. Id. ¶ 96 (Hall, J.). 
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England.190  Thus, although Calder did not identify the source of abori-
ginal title, Justice Mahoney in Baker Lake viewed aboriginal title as a 
common law right.  Shortly thereafter, in 1982, the Canadian Constitu-
tion was amended to provide that “the existing Aboriginal and treaty 
rights of Canada’s Aboriginal peoples are . . . recognized and af-
firmed.”191  In contrast to the United States, where Indian title may be 
terminated “without any legally enforceable obligation to compensate the 
Indians,”192 equivalent indigenous land rights in Canada now enjoy con-
stitutional protection.193 
Although Canadian courts have endorsed Johnson and related deci-
sions of the United States Supreme Court, the two countries have devel-
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Indian title is a property right independent of the 1763 Proclamation and also held that a fiduciary 
relationship exists between the Crown and the Indians that “has its roots in the concept of aboriginal, 
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more that “[t]he view of aboriginal rights as based in the prior occupation of North America by 
distinctive aboriginal societies, finds support in the early American decisions of [Chief Justice Mar-
shall].”  Van der Peet v. The Queen, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, ¶ 35 (Can.) (Lamer, C.J.).  Speaking for 
the Court, Chief Justice Antonio Lamer acknowledged that Canadian aboriginal law “has developed 
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(quoting Brian Slattery, Understanding Aboriginal Rights, 66 CAN. B. REV. 727, 739 (1987).  Most 
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influence on the historic Calder decision, which “recognized for the first time in the modern era that 
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nie, J.). 
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oped different views of the rights of indigenous peoples to property and 
sovereignty.  As noted by Kent McNeil, whereas American Indian tribes 
have “both residual sovereignty and land rights in the territories occupied 
by them, . . . the Canadian Supreme Court has determined that Aborigin-
al title is a property right arising from occupation of land that is separate 
from governance rights.”194  McNeil observes, however, that some courts 
in Canada have “acknowledged that Aboriginal nations have decision-
making authority over their collectively held lands . . . .”195  It appears, 
therefore, that Canada is moving cautiously towards the American model 
where aboriginal land rights and native sovereignty are treated as related 
issues. 
VI.  NEW ZEALAND TODAY: “THE CROWN HAS NO PROPERTY RIGHT IN 
CUSTOMARY LAND” 
The New Zealand Supreme Court, in Symonds v The Queen, held 
that the Mâori retained “modified” rights to use and occupy their lands 
after the Crown acquired sovereignty and the right of preemption.196  
Subsequent legislation and judicial pronouncements, however, were less 
respectful of indigenous land rights.  In Wi Parata v Bishop of Welling-
ton, Chief Justice James Prendergast declared that the Mâori had “no 
regular system of territorial rights nor any definite ideas of property in 
land” and characterized the cession of sovereignty in the Treaty of Wai-
tangi as “a simple nullity.”197  It was not until the New Zealand Supreme 
Court’s 1986 decision in Te Weehi v Regional Fisheries Officer that New 
Zealand unequivocally rejected Wi Parata and returned to the views ex-
pressed in Symonds. 
A comprehensive study of New Zealand indigenous land policy is 
beyond the scope of this Article.  A brief survey, however, shows that the 
legislative and judicial response to the Mâori in the nineteenth century 
was not unlike what was taking place in the United States during the 
same time period.  In the last half of the nineteenth century, the United 
States ended treaty making with Indians and enacted the General Allot-
ment Act, which was designed to transfer communally owned tribal 
lands to individual Indians who, by virtue of their land ownership, would 
be assimilated into the mainstream society.198  Indian reservations were 
reduced in size, and by 1934, approximately two-thirds of native lands in 
                                                 
 194. Kent McNeil, supra note 13, at 282. 
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 196. The Queen v Symonds (1847) NZPCC 387, 390 (N.Z.). 
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the United States were converted to non-Indian ownership.199  In compar-
ison, by characterizing uncultivated lands as “waste lands of the Crown,” 
the amount of New Zealand subject to native title was significantly re-
duced, and by the late 1850s, the Crown had clear title to nearly all of the 
South Island and most of the lower part of the North Island.200  In 1862 
and 1865, the legislature enacted statutes that waived preemption and 
established a process whereby Mâori lands were converted to individual-
ly held lands.201  The result was “a disastrous free-for-all” and the sale of 
large amounts of land to the Pâkehâ (New Zealanders of European ance-
stry).202 
During this same period, the United States Supreme Court asserted 
plenary control over Indian affairs in United States v. Kagama and Lone 
Wolf v. Hitchcock.203  These decisions denigrate and dismiss indigenous 
sovereignty and thus serve as counterparts to Chief Justice Prendergast’s 
1877 decision in Wi Parata.204  Wi Parata, a noted Mâori politician, sued 
the Bishop of Wellington over land that had been offered to the Church 
in exchange for a school that was never built.205  Despite its failure to 
fulfill the agreement, the Church obtained a Crown grant without the 
knowledge or consent of the Ngati Toa tribe.206  Wi Parata argued that 
the native title had not been extinguished in a proper manner, as required 
by the Treaty of Waitangi.207 
Despite the undisputed failure to comply with the Treaty, the Court 
upheld the grant.  In contrast to the “modified” rights language it es-
poused in Symonds, the New Zealand Supreme Court, in Wi Parata, held 
that “the supreme executive Government must acquit itself, as best it 
may, of its obligations to respect native proprietary rights, and of neces-
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sity must be the sole arbiter of its own justice.”208  Chief Justice Prender-
gast then erroneously cited Johnson v. McIntosh in support of his view 
that “there existed amongst the natives no regular system of territorial 
rights nor any definite ideas of property in land.”209  The most infamous 
statement in Wi Parata, however, was Prendergast’s assertion that be-
cause “no body politic” existed in New Zealand in 1840, the part of the 
Treaty of Waitangi that purported to cede Mâori sovereignty “must be 
regarded as a simple nullity.”210  With respect to “the proprietary rights 
of the natives,” Prendergast declared that “the so-called treaty merely 
affirms the rights and obligations which, jure gentium [by the law of na-
tions], vested in and devolved upon the Crown under the circumstances 
of the case.”211  With respect to the proprietary rights of the Crown, the 
Chief Justice again relied on the law of nations: “[T]he title of the Crown 
to the country was acquired, jure gentium, by discovery and priority of 
occupation, as a territory inhabited only by savages.”212  In the words of 
Paul McHugh, Wi Parata “went beyond Marshall’s doctrine of a subsist-
ing but limited tribal sovereignty to a denial of any original sovereignty 
whatsoever.”213 
Relying on both the principle of customary law and the Treaty of 
Waitangi, the Privy Council rejected Wi Parata on two separate occa-
sions.  In Nireaha Tamaki v Baker, the Council took issue with Prender-
gast’s opinion, observing that it was “rather late in the day” to contend 
that “there is no customary law of the Maoris of which the Courts of law 
can take cognizance.”214  In support of its rejection of Wi Parata, the 
Council cited both Symonds and Johnson and noted that the decisions of 
John Marshall “are entitled to the greatest respect although not binding 
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on a British Court.”215  Soon thereafter, in Wallis v Solicitor General for 
New Zealand, the Privy Council restated that the Treaty of Waitangi gave 
the Crown the right of preemption but otherwise guaranteed the Mâori 
“the exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands so long as they 
desired to possess them.”216  The two decisions prompted a “Protest of 
Bench and Bar”—the only recorded instance of New Zealand judges 
publicly criticizing the Privy Council.217  According to Chief Justice Ro-
bert Stout, the “root of title” was in the Crown and therefore “the Court 
could not recognize Native title.”218  Remarkably, Stout cited Symonds as 
well as Wi Parata in support of his position.219 
The Privy Council cases notwithstanding, the status of both the 
Treaty of Waitangi and Mâori land rights remained uncertain throughout 
much of the twentieth century.220  Starting in the 1970s, however, the 
legislature and the judiciary took steps to clarify the meaning of the Trea-
ty and the extent of Mâori customary rights.  In 1975, New Zealand 
enacted the Treaty of Waitangi Act, which empowered a tribunal to in-
vestigate future government actions that were contrary to the “principles” 
of the 1840 Treaty.221  Eleven years later, in Te Weehi, the High Court of 
New Zealand (Christchurch) held that a Mâori charged with possessing 
undersized paua (sea snails) was lawfully exercising a customary fishing 
right.222  In 1994, the New Zealand Court of Appeal, in Te Runanganui o 
Te Ika Whenua Inc. Society v Attorney-General, described the “nature 
and incidents of aboriginal title” as fact-based and variable: at one ex-
treme they may approach “the full rights of proprietorship of an estate in 
fee recognised at common law,” and at the other extreme “they may be 
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treated as at best a mere permissive and apparently arbitrarily revocable 
occupancy.”223 
Although Johnson v. McIntosh was not mentioned in either Te 
Weehi or Te Runanganui, the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General v 
Ngati Apa did refer to Johnson in its discussion of whether customary 
Mâori title extended to the foreshore and seabed; that is, lands that were 
either temporarily or permanently under saltwater.  Judges Noel Ander-
son and Sir Kenneth Keith noted that Johnson recognized existing native 
rights, which were characterized as a “right of occupancy” and which 
remained a burden on title until extinguished.224  Judge Dame Sian Elias 
cited Johnson for the proposition that native rights are “rights at common 
law, not simply moral claims against the Crown.”225   The opinion of 
Judge Elias also contains statements that reaffirm Mâori land rights in 
strong and unequivocal terms: 
The radical title of the Crown is a technical and notional concept.  It 
is not inconsistent with common law recognition of native proper-
ty . . . .  Maori customary land is a residual category of property, de-
fined by custom.  Crown land, by contrast, is defined as land which 
is not customary land and which has not been alienated from the 
Crown for an estate in fee simple.  The Crown has no property in-
terest in customary land and is not the source of title to it.226 
Ngati Apa not only disposed of Wi Parata, but also was a victory 
for proponents of native title insofar as the Court of Appeal held that the 
Mâori Land Court had jurisdiction to address customary claims to fore-
shore and seabed.  The New Zealand government subsequently an-
nounced, however, that it would assert Crown ownership and accom-
plished the task in the Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004.227  The Mâori 
brought the issue before the United Nations’ Committee on Elimination 
of Racial Discrimination, which concluded that the legislation discrimi-
nates against the Mâori, “particular[ly] in its extinguishment of the pos-
sibility of establishing Mâori customary titles over the foreshore and 
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seabed . . . .”228  The U.N. Committee also stated the legislation was con-
trary to New Zealand’s obligations under articles 5 and 6 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion.229  The U.N. Committee, unfortunately, lacks the authority to 
mandate a repeal of the Foreshore and Seabed Act.230 
VII.  AUSTRALIA TODAY: TERRA NULLIUS NO MORE 
Because the continent was sparsely populated, because the natives 
did not cultivate the land in a manner similar to Europeans, and because 
it was convenient, the Crown considered Australia to be terra nullius—
the land of no one.  The doctrine endured as a legal fiction for over 150 
years, yet its longevity did not lead to acquiescence.  In 1964, an Abori-
gine named Joyce Mercy stepped forward at a National Aboriginal Rally 
in Sydney and informed the crowd that “Australia is the only country in 
the world which does not recognize that its Indigenous people have a 
right to land.”231  The terra nullius principle was challenged—
unsuccessfully—in 1971 in the Supreme Court of the Northern Territo-
ry232 and again in 1979 before the High Court of Australia.233  Due to the 
persistence of Eddie Koiki Mabo and other like-minded advocates, the 
High Court revisited the issue in Mabo v Queensland (No. 2).234  On June 
3, 1992, the High Court held that “the common law of this country re-
cognizes a form of native title which, in the cases where it has not been 
extinguished, reflects the entitlement of the indigenous inhabitants, in 
accordance with their laws or customs, to their traditional lands . . . .”235  
In other words, Australia is terra nullius no more. 
In order to place Mabo (No. 2) in proper context, it is necessary to 
briefly discuss prior efforts to dismantle the terra nullius doctrine.  In 
1971, Justice Richard Blackburn of the Supreme Court of the Northern 
Territory held that “[t]he doctrine of communal native title contended for 
by the natives did not form, and never had formed, part of the law of any 
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part of Australia.”236  Blackburn was bound by prior precedent—“I must 
hold that these claims are not in the nature of proprietary interests”237—
but nevertheless considered the issue in some detail.  Prominent in his 
discussion of the doctrine of discovery are several references to Johnson 
v. McIntosh.238  Marshall’s statements, Blackburn concluded, “do not 
affirm the principle that the Indian ‘right of occupancy’ was an interest 
which could be set up against the sovereign, or against a grantee of the 
sovereign, in the same manner as an interest arising under the ordinary 
law of real property.”239  Blackburn further observed, following his dis-
cussion of Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, that “[i]f the doctrine of 
communal native title ever existed in the United States, it does no long-
er.”240 
Although initially unsuccessful, litigation challenging the doctrine 
of terra nullius continued.  In 1978, the Aboriginal lawyer Paul Coe filed 
suit on behalf of the entire Aboriginal community, alleging that British 
officials “wrongfully treated the continent now known as Australia as 
terra nullius whereas it was occupied by the sovereign aboriginal na-
tion . . . .”241  The High Court affirmed the dismissal of Coe’s motion to 
amend his statement of claim, holding that direct challenges to the validi-
ty of the Crown’s claim of sovereignty and sovereign possession were 
“not cognisable in a court exercising jurisdiction under that sovereignty 
which is sought to be challenged.”242  The Coe litigation, however, drew 
attention to the injustice of the terra nullius doctrine.  Advocates for Ab-
original rights gained another small victory in Gerhardy v Brown, when 
High Court Justice William Deane offered the following critical observa-
tion: 
                                                 
 236. Milirrpum, 17 FLR at 143.  Blackburn described the Batman purchase as “simply a tres-
pass on Crown land.”  Id. at 257.  The Milirrpum litigation is also referred to as the “Gove Land 
Rights Case” because it was brought by the Aboriginal people of Cape Gove, which is located on the 
coast of north-central Australia. 
 237. Id. at 273 (Blackburn, J) (emphasis added); see also RUSSELL, supra note 61, at 254–55. 
 238. See, e.g., Milirrpum, 17 FLR at 200–04, 211–14. 
 239. Id. at 213. 
 240. Id. at 218. 
 241. BAIN ATTWOOD & ANDREW MARKUS, THE STRUGGLE FOR ABORIGINAL RIGHTS: A 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 291 (1999) (amended statement of claim, 8A (also 21A), in Coe v. Com-
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 242. Coe v Commonwealth (1979) 53 ALJR 403, 410 (Austl.) (Jacobs, J); see also Robert 
French, The Constitution and the People, in REFLECTIONS ON THE AUSTRALIAN CONSTITUTION 79 
(Robert French, Geoffrey Lindell & Cheryl Saunders eds., 2003). 
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[T]he common law of this land has still not reached the stage of re-
treat from injustice which the law . . . had reached in 1823 when 
[Chief Justice] Marshall, in Johnson v. McIntosh, accepted 
that . . . the “original inhabitants” should be recognized as having “a 
legal as well as just claim” to retain the occupancy of their tradi-
tional lands.243 
Finally, in 1992, Justice Deane joined with five other justices of the 
High Court of Australia to overturn the most extreme version of the doc-
trine of discovery—the doctrine of terra nullius.  The historic decision, 
Mabo (No. 2), contains several references to Johnson v. McIntosh.  Mar-
shall’s 1823 decision is cited on two occasions in the opinion handed 
down by Justice Deane and Justice Mary Gaudron and is both cited and 
quoted by Justice Daryl Dawson.244  Although the High Court was care-
ful to note the “special constitutional and historical considerations” that 
influence American cases, it also expressly acknowledged that “the no-
tion of native or Indian title owes much to the celebrated judgment of 
[Chief Justice] Marshall in the case of Johnson v McIntosh.”245  Richard 
Bartlett has stated that “the rhetoric in Mabo No. 2 was of justice and 
equality before the law, but the conclusions reflect the pragmatism em-
ployed by [Chief Justice] Marshall in 1823.”246  Peter Russell, in his 
book on Mabo (No. 2), reaches a similar conclusion: 
The moral structure of the High Court’s decision in Mabo 
(No. 2) is reminiscent of the jurisprudence of Chief Justice John 
Marshall . . . who tried to square recognition of Indigenous peoples’ 
rights with acceptance of their colonization. . . . The same utilitarian 
subordination of the fundamental human rights of Indigenous 
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peoples to the interests of the settler majority is evident in the ma-
jority’s position in Mabo (No. 2).247 
Although the High Court held that “a mere change in sovereignty does 
not extinguish native title to land,” it also held that the common law did 
not recognize a right of compensation for extinguishment of native 
title.248  Australia is terra nullius no more, but the Crown is still ac-
knowledged to be the owner of the underlying title to indigenous 
lands.249 
The Mabo (No. 2) decision charts a new path for Australia, and 
both the government and the courts have taken subsequent steps in defin-
ing the scope of native title.250  Johnson v. McIntosh played a role in this 
reconstruction.  For example, in Wik Peoples v Queensland, the High 
Court cited Johnson for the proposition that a sovereign may extinguish 
native title but held (by a 4–3 vote) that the issuance of pastoral leases 
did not necessarily extinguish all incidents of native title.251  Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall’s views on the extinguishment of native title were 
also noted by the High Court in Fejo v Northern Territory and by the 
Federal Court of Australia in Western Australia v Ward.252 
                                                 
 247. RUSSELL, supra note 61, at 249. 
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National Native Title Tribunal to hear claims and provide other forms of assistance to indigenous 
peoples.  Amendments to the Act passed in 1998, however, limited the ability of indigenous peoples 
to claim native title.  As in the case of the New Zealand Foreshore and Seabed Act of 2004, the 
government’s decision to amend the Native Title Act was criticized by United Nations Committee 
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Varying Populations, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 297, 306 (2008). 
 251. Wik Peoples v Queensland (1996) 187 CLR 1, 123 n.456 (Austl.) (Toohey, J); see also 
RUSSELL, supra note 61, at 316–19. 
 252. See Fejo v Northern Territory (1998) 195 CLR 96, 153 (Austl.) (Kirby, J) (“The concept 
of the extinguishment of the rights in land of indigenous peoples as a result of the advancing claims 
to legal title of the settlers appears to have originated in the decision of the Supreme Court of the 
United States in Johnson v McIntosh.”); Western Australia v Ward (2000) 99 FCR 316, 519 (North, 
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On February 13, 2008, Prime Minister Kevin Rudd stood in the 
Federal Parliament and formally apologized for the fact that—due to 
“calculated policies of the state”—up to 50,000 indigenous children were 
forcibly taken from their families between 1910 and 1970.253  Similarly, 
the High Court’s decision in Mabo (No. 2) can be read as an apology to 
the Aborigines of Australia.  Justice Brennan noted in the 1992 decision 
that the conventional wisdom—“that the indigenous inhabitants of a ‘set-
tled’ colony had no proprietary interest in the land”—depended on “a 
discriminatory denigration of indigenous inhabitants, their social organi-
zation and customs,” which must be rejected as “false in fact and unac-
ceptable in our society . . . .”254  Justices Deane and Gaudron likewise 
acknowledged that “the dispossession and oppression of the Aborigines” 
was premised on legal fictions: that the continent in 1788 was terra nul-
lius and that ownership of all the lands vested in the Crown, unaffected 
by any claims of the Aboriginal inhabitants.255  By means of a simple 
declaration—that “the lands of this continent were not terra nullius or 
‘practically unoccupied’ in 1788”—the Justices rejected the longstand-
ing legal theories that had constituted “the darkest aspect of the history of 
this nation.”256 
VIII.  THE 2007 U.N. DECLARATION ON THE RIGHTS OF INDIGENOUS 
PEOPLES 
Indigenous peoples remain hopeful that emerging principles of in-
ternational law will produce tangible benefits in terms of safeguarding 
rights to land and natural resources.257  The most significant development 
in recent years has been the adoption of the U.N. Declaration on the 
                                                                                                             
J, dissenting) (“The decision of the Supreme Court of the United States in Johnson v McIntosh is 
regarded as the source of the concept of extinguishment of native title.”).  In Fejo, the Court held 
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 254. Mabo v Queensland (No. 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 40 (Austl.). 
 255. Id. at 108. 
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 257. See Anaya & Williams, supra note 191; Meghan Theresa McCauley, Comment, Empo-
wering Change: Building the Case for International Indigenous Land Rights in the United States, 41 
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Rights of Indigenous Peoples.258  The Declaration contains several provi-
sions that acknowledge the rights of indigenous peoples to their lands.  
Article 26 states that indigenous peoples “have the right to the lands, ter-
ritories and resources which they have traditionally owned, occupied or 
otherwise used or acquired,” and that nation states “shall give legal rec-
ognition and protection to these lands, territories and resources . . . with 
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the in-
digenous peoples concerned.”259  Article 28 provides that indigenous 
peoples 
have the right to redress, by means that can include restitution or, 
when this is not possible, just, fair and equitable compensation, for 
the lands, territories and resources which they have traditionally 
owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confis-
cated, taken, occupied, used or damaged without their free, prior 
and informed consent.260 
Other articles also address the rights of indigenous peoples to remain on 
their lands, make use of their lands, and be consulted about activities af-
fecting their lands.261 
The U.N. General Assembly voted to adopt the Declaration over the 
opposition of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and the United States.  In 
its statement in opposition to the Declaration, the United States empha-
sized that the Declaration is an aspirational document that does not pro-
vide a basis for legal claims in any international or domestic forum.262  
Nevertheless, Bolivia adopted the Declaration at the national level, and 
                                                 
 258. G.A. Res. 61/295, U.N. GAOR, 61st Sess., 107th plen. mtg., U.N. 
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the Supreme Court of Belize acknowledged the persuasive force of Ar-
ticle 26 in support of its recognition of customary Mayan land rights.263 
In April 2009, Australia reversed its prior position and endorsed the 
Declaration, stating that the document “sets important international prin-
ciples for nations to aspire to.”264  A year later, on April 19, 2010, New 
Zealand reversed its position and announced qualified support for the 
Declaration.265  Several months thereafter, on November 12, 2010, the 
Canadian government gave its formal endorsement, stating that “Canada 
can interpret the principles expressed in the Declaration in a manner that 
is consistent with our Constitution and legal framework.”266  Finally, on 
December 16, 2010, President Barack Obama announced that the United 
States “is lending its support” to the Declaration.267  According to the 
President, “[t]he aspirations it affirms—including the respect for the in-
stitutions and rich cultures of Native peoples—are one[s] we must al-
ways seek to fulfill.”268  It remains to be seen whether the 2007 U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples will become an actual 
source of enforceable rights for indigenous peoples.  If international 
norms of the nineteenth century are no longer accepted, the legal doc-
trines based on such norms—such as the doctrine of discovery—should 
be reconsidered.  The High Court of Australia, in Mabo (No. 2), ac-
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knowledged that the evolution of international law lent support to its re-
jection of the terra nullius doctrine.269 
There are indications that a movement has begun to re-
conceptualize indigenous land rights and that a new era is dawning.  In-
digenous peoples, legal scholars, religious institutions, and non-
governmental organizations have all pressed for the official repudiation 
of the discovery doctrine.270  For example, in 2009, delegates to the Par-
liament of the World’s Religions met in Melbourne, Australia and called 
upon the Vatican “to publicly acknowledge and repudiate the papal de-
crees that legitimized the original activities that have evolved into the 
dehumanizing Doctrine of Christian Discovery and dominion in laws and 
policies.”271  Additionally, the Episcopal Church of the United States and 
the Anglican Church of Canada have both renounced the doctrine of dis-
covery “as fundamentally opposed to the Gospel of Jesus Christ and our 
understanding of the inherent rights that individuals and peoples have 
received from God.”272  John Dieffenbacher-Krall, the executive director 
of the Maine Indian Tribal State Commission, has called for “an all out 
effort to overturn Johnson v. M’Intosh just as the NAACP legal defense 
fund and many civil rights activists worked strategically to overturn 
Plessy v. Ferguson.”273 
Although the discovery doctrine is not expressly mentioned in the 
2007 Declaration,274 it has been critiqued and criticized within the United 
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Nations.  In April 2010, Special Rapporteur Tonya Gonnella Frichner, a 
member of the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues, 
released her “[p]reliminary study of the impact on indigenous peoples of 
the international legal construct known as the Doctrine of Discovery,” 
which contends that the doctrine of discovery “has been institutionalized 
in law and policy, on national and international levels, and lies at the root 
of the violations of indigenous peoples’ human rights, both individual 
and collective.”275 
Yet despite calls for repudiation, the Vatican Church, the nations of 
Europe, and the United States continue to recognize the discovery doc-
trine, and the principles and royal charters that legitimized the coloniza-
tion of the New World remain in effect.  For too long the United States, 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada have invoked the American doc-
trine of discovery to diminish native land rights.  By endorsing the U.N. 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, however, the aforemen-
tioned countries have taken a significant step in the right direction.  The 
United States declared in December 2010 that it “aspires to improve rela-
tions with indigenous peoples by looking to the principles embodied in 
the Declaration in its dealings with federally recognized tribes, while 
also working, as appropriate, with all indigenous individuals and com-
munities in the United States.”276  In his accompanying remarks, Presi-
dent Obama acknowledged that “[w]hat matters far more than 
words . . . are actions to match those words.”277  It is time for the United 
States to take action and formally reject the discovery doctrine. 
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